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Abstract. Algocracy is the rule by algorithms. This paper summarises technolo-
gies useful to create algocratic social machines and presents idealistic examples
of their application. In particular, it describes smart contracts and their implemen-
tations, challenges of behaviour mining and prediction, as well as game-theoretic
and AI approaches to mechanism design. The presented idealistic examples of
new algocratic solutions are picked from the reality of a modern state. The exam-
ples are science funding, trade by organisations, regulation of rental agreements,
ranking of significance and sortition. Artificial General Intelligence is not in the
scope of this feasibility study.
Keywords: Algocracy, Behavioral Economics, Data Mining, Game Theory, Mecha-
nism Design, General Game Playing, Experimental Economics, Domain-Specific Lan-
guages, Smart Contract
1 Introduction
During the COVID-19 pandemic in spring of 2020, the phenomenon of the rise in pop-
ularity of the ’human microchip implant’ conspiracy theory could be observed, which
has its roots in the biblical ’mark of the beast’ prophecy [1]. Despite the missing ev-
idence, its worldwide popularity growth reveals the existence of public apprehension
about the possible radical transformation of forms of government and social orders due
to the progress in information technology. This type of fear previously known from cy-
berpunk literature even motivated numerous worldwide arson attacks on 5G towers.
According to a 2019’s poll of IE University of Spain, only 25% of European citi-
zens are in favour of letting algorithms run their countries [2]. The Netherlands showed
the highest approval rate of 45% in this study. Nevertheless, the algorithmic predic-
tor of welfare fraud SyRI caused a public protest in the same Netherlands in the same
year [3]. On the other hand, since 2012 secretive deployments of algorithms in public
regulation like the cooperation between Palantir Technologies and New Orleans Police
Department are documented [4]. The use of information technology in public regulation
is connotated with conspirative actions of the minority without consent of the majority.
This might encumber further progress of such technologies for the common good. The
apprehension of a radical transformation should be addressed in open scientific research
to clear the fog of superstition and conspiracy theories, to improve technologies and to
identify possible advantages.
Application of information technology in governmental administration enabled E-
Government, which is more efficient communication within state agencies, between
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state and non-state organisations, and between state and citizens. But, the actual radical
transformation will be the decision-making by algorithms in place of humans and is not
covered by the term E-Government [5].
The rule by algorithms can be termed as algocracy, where algo- is derived from al-
gorithm and -cracy is ’rule’ in ancient Greek. Unfortunately, academic literature creates
no consensus in the usage of any single term. A. Aneesh introduced the term algoc-
racy in 2006 [6], T. O’Reily introduced the term algorithmic regulation in 2013 [7] and
Stanford’s 2020’s report about the application of AI in US government agencies uses
the term government by algorithm [8]. Other terms for the same issue are algorithmic
power [9], governing algorithms [10] and algorithmic governance [11]. The term cy-
bercracy decodes as rule by effective use of information, which does not necessarily
imply the usage of algorithms [12]. This paper will use the term algocracy.
Algocracy is not a basic form of government, it is an enhancement to the existing
forms of governments. Algorithms are not living beings and have no intrinsic prefer-
ences and goals unless introduced by human engineers. T. Berners-Lee describes pro-
cesses, which combine people and algorithms as social machines [13]. In social ma-
chines, people are coordinated and administrated by algorithms and algorithms are en-
gineered by people [14]. Surely, only a small group of people will be competent enough
to engineer and maintain the algorithms. In an algocratic dictatorship, the preferences
for algocratic social machine (PASM) would come from the dictator and in an ideal-
istic algocratic democracy from the people. However, a study of the real democracy in
the United States showed that adopted policies are most correlated with the economic
elitesâA˘Z´ preferences at 0.79 and have no significant correlation to the preferences of
common citizens [15]. There is also some weak correlation to the preferences of busi-
ness and mass-based groups. It is a question, whether an algocratic democracy will
replace economic elites by engineering elites as the major source of preferences for the
adopted policies, or the economic elites will command the engineers, or both elites’
types will merge.
Dictatorial states might have only one faction of these engineers and pluralist states
multiple factions. These factions might compete peacefully against each other as com-
panies on the free market, as political agendas in democratic elections or as open-border
states in foot voting. Non-peaceful competition would include espionage, cyber war-
fare, economical warfare and violent hostilities. According to Y. N. Harrari, democra-
cies outperformed dictatorships concerning innovation and economic growth in the late
20th-century, because they were better at processing information, but will underperform
against dictatorships using central algorithms in the future [16]. It can also be argued
that an algocratic dictatorship might lose its technological edge over time, if it only
has one faction of algocracy engineers without internal competition. Algocracy can be
studied without predictions about the source of PASM. Let us only assume that PASM
are always there no matter they came from a single dictator, certain elites or people.
There is one important difference to traditional governments – algocracy is con-
strained to have a certain minimal level of technology and industrialisation for pro-
duction of data centres, communication infrastructure, surveillance equipment, etc.. A
sustainable algocracy, therefore, requires a sustainable technosphere of certain mini-
mal ecological footprint. This ecological footprint assembles as the space needed for
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the production of energy from sustainable sources as well as the space needed for the
manufacturing and recycling facilities. Given a planet of finite space, algocracy is also
constrained by a certain maximal expansion of the technosphere, which can be safely
taken without seriously damaging the biosphere. These two boundaries make the PASM
more predictable wherever they came from.
Algocracy has to coordinate technosphere and the human population. Coordination
of technosphere is a trivial command and control system. Coordinating human popu-
lation is highly non-trivial and studied by multiple disciplines including jurisprudence
and behaviour science. Every single human is an individual with her or his preferences,
faults and thinking patterns. There are many ways to achieve coordination and the most
obvious way is the formation of organisations. According to organisational theorist A.
Stinchcombe, organisations can be viewed as contracts or complexes of contracts [17].
The contracts like rental agreement, trade deals, employment contracts and so on are
enforced by the judiciary system of a state. And the state including its judiciary system
itself can be viewed as a social contract according to J.-J. Rousseau [18]. Seeing citi-
zenship and state laws as contractual agreements even experience modern revival in the
form of free private cities initiatives [19]. In the context of free private cities, a state is
regarded as a government service provider, which concludes a contract with its citizens
[20].
This paper’s goal is to investigate setting up and enforcement of complexes of con-
tracts as the part in the coordination of population by the means of algorithms. This
impacts the three forces of powers, the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. Leg-
islature and judiciary are considered to be fully automated usingWeak AI in the near fu-
ture. The full automation of the executive requires Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).
For instance, a fully-automated ability to react to unexpected socioeconomic crises like
the COVID-19 pandemic is beyond the definition of Weak AI. Government by AGI is
highly controversial and not relevant in this paper.
The next section 2 describes the historical development. Section 3 makes a sum-
mary of relevant technologies. Then in section 4, five examples of algocratic solutions
to common problems are presented and a conclusion in section 5 lists seven theses as a
result.
2 Historical Milestones
Contracts, which are enforced by machines instead of state agencies, judges and inves-
tigators, are called smart contracts [21]. A vending machine is the first simplest piece
of technology known to humanity since the times of Heron of Alexandria, which man-
ifests a smart contract [17]. Proposals for coordination of economy by algorithms are
known since the second half of the 20th century. A. Kharkevich proposed processing
information in order to control their economy in 1962 [22] and Chile deployed Project
Cybersyn in 1971–1973 [23].
Since the 1960s, H. Simon pioneered expert systems for judiciary and administra-
tion [24]. Such branches of administration as tax offices have a decades-long history of
the deployment of rule-based systems [25]. Examples of those automated systems for
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legal reasoning are TAXMAN by T. McCarty and LEGOL by R. Stamper [26,27].
The term smart contract was introduced by N. Szabo in 1994 [28]. Since 2000s,
systems for automated surveillance are developed [29]. China started to develop its So-
cial Credit System from 2009 on [30]. Social Credit System is actually a smart contract
about the calculation of certain reputation score based on information available to the
system from mass surveillance. The calculated score has far-reaching consequences on
the lives of Chinese citizens – it automatically improves or denies access to a broad
category of services. Multiple non-state facilitators of platform economies like Uber or
AirBnB employ less restrictive reputation systems, where interaction peers take deci-
sions based on public reputation records rather than a central authority doing it.
Since 2014 smart contracts were redefined more precisely as contracts, whose en-
forcement also does not require any trusted computing [31]. In the newer sense, smart
contracts are programs, which are executed on a blockchain virtual machine and can
not be manipulated by any node in a solo attempt. The terms of a smart contract are the
code of the smart contract. In 2016, the first decentralised autonomous organisation The
DAO was launched as a smart contract on a blockchain, which resembled an investor-
driven venture capital fund [32].
The automation of judiciary system also progressed in recent years. Since 2016,
multiple US courts use COMPAS software, which assists in risk assessment of recidi-
vism prior to a court decision [33]. China claims to be the first country to run an AI
automated court in 2019 [34]. Also, Estonia uttered similar plans of letting AI decide
on cases under 7.000e [35]. Automation of judiciary leads to the same result as the
replacement of judiciary by self-executing smart contracts.
3 Weak AI Algocracy
Fig.1 depicts the main technology areas relevant to algocracy. Smart contracts are not
only contracts between individuals and companies. Smart contracts are also laws, which
apply to state and citizens. We speak about self-executing laws, which include crime
regulations, taxation and obligations of the state. For our vision of algocracy, the ex-
ecution of smart contracts has to be trustful, but their execution on a blockchain is
not obligatory. In fact, a blockchain implementation can not hinder the communica-
tion of contract participants over additional channels, if it is required by the contract.
A blockchain solely provides trustful computation, even if none of the nodes can be
trusted.
The process of engineering of new smart contracts falls into the discipline of mech-
anism design. As already been assumed, the PASM are always present and the mech-
anism design needs some assumptions about preferences and behaviour patterns of the
human population. Obviously, there is a large amount of smart contracts, which will
undermine the PASM, even if the participation in them is voluntary. Such harmful con-
tracts have to be blocked. The harm from a smart contract can range from functional
bugs like in the famous Ethereum hack of 2014 to more subtle consequences like in
case of a bogus reputation system e.g.. The engineering of smart contracts has the goal
to achieve the predefined PASM by useful contracts and to block harmful contracts.
What Government by Algorithm Might Look Like 5
Smart Contracts
Behavior Mining Mechanism Design
Algocracy
Fig. 1. The triangle of research fields for Weak AI algocracy.
Mechanism design is originally a sub-field of game theory, but also can be seen as
a sub-field of AI. Mechanism design should produce rules to achieve certain behaviour
of the players, once preferences of interacting individuals are known. It is a reverse task
to the rest of game theory, where the rules are known and the behaviour of the players
aka Nash equilibrium is wanted. Classical game theory research came up with homo
economicus assumption and saw humans being exclusively interested in monetary in-
centives, rational and able to foresee the consequences of their action many turns ahead.
Field and laboratory data extenuated this assumption and revealed a more complicated
structure of incentives, boundaries to rationality and ability to reason. Assumption of
rationality is only a useful orientation in the analysis of behavioural data, which helps
to reduce the hypotheses space [36,37,38].
In a non-algocratic society, a process related to mechanism design takes either
place in a democratic parliament or behind closed doors in a less democratic govern-
ment form. For instance, laws are introduced, which discourage crime by punishment.
This process is crucial for the survival and success of the whole society. Given that the
pursuit of certain PASM are taken seriously, the creation of appropriate smart contracts
will be a non-trivial process and requires major complex calculation indeed beyond hu-
man capabilities, but still in the tangibility for Weak AI.
Mechanism design can be seen as a search in the space of possible smart contracts,
which is performed by genetic programming e.g.. In order to evaluate the gain or the
harm from a smart contract, a prediction of its consequences has to be calculated. Fig.2
shows an abstract definition of the algorithm for this prediction. If there is any pertinent
literature or any other kind of a legitimate record about the consequences, the solution
is found.
If there is no literature, an analytical solution has to be created to guide the data
analysis. This can be done by game-theoretic or AI algorithms. Field data of human be-
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Pertinent Literature
Prediction
Field Data
Analyse Data
Create Agent Models
Simulate
Create Analytical Solution
Laboratory Data
Run an Experiment
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fig. 2. Algorithm for prediction of consequences of a given smart contract.
haviour produced by the actual or similar contracts would be ideal for the analysis, even
if it is noisy. The field experimental economics provides a certain amount of clean data
sets, which can help to predict human behaviour if field data is not available. Finally,
if no useful data is available, a field or laboratory experiment should be run. The goal
is either to derive a prediction or to build agent models of human behaviour using this
data. And this task is called behaviour mining or also cognitive modelling. If the anal-
ysis of the data is not sufficient to make a prediction, a simulation with agent models
of human behaviour has to be used. The whole algorithm of engineering a useful smart
contract does not include any parts, which require AGI.
The core element of this vision of algocracy is an appropriate scripting language for
smart contracts. Scripting languages for blockchains are a special issue. There is a dis-
cussion about the need for Turing-completeness. In 2019, only 35,3% of 53757 smart
contracts from Ethereum included loops and recursions [39], which are related to the
halting problem. The Turing-completeness of the language creates more risk for bugs.
The language should be of maximal usability and readability for humans. Algorithms
for analytical solutions, tools for experiments, data analysis engines and simulation
environments should understand the same language without reformatting. Today, both
types of scripting languages exist – with and without Turing-completeness.
Simulation of agent interactions falls in the scope of General Game Playing (GGP).
GGP is a design of AI algorithms, which can not only interact according to some special
rules but also understand any rules written in special language [40]. It is a step towards
AGI – design of general algorithms, which can play chess, checkers and poker likewise.
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And also for GGP, there exist two types of language. PNSI is not Turing-complete, be-
cause it is based on Petri Nets [41]. GDL is Turing-complete and is based on Datalog
[42]. Scripting languages for experimental economics’ tools like z-Tree are obviously
Turing-complete [43].
In game theory, the most powerful class of games are games of imperfect informa-
tion with moves of nature. Moves of nature are random events. Imperfect information
is missing knowledge about other players’ turns or random events. Fig.3 shows an ex-
ample of such a game. The realisation of random number generator on a blockchain
is a complicated issue since the computation has to deliver the same result indepen-
dent of the node performing it. This issue can be solved, if a source of entropy can
be introduced, which can not be manipulated by participants [44]. Such sources of en-
tropy can be the timestamps, transaction statistics, numbers committed by participants,
smart contracts and sequences of actions from mixed strategy Nash equilibria games.
Imperfect information is a more complicated issue. For instance, a Vickrey auction de-
livers the auctioneer optimal results, only if the bidders do not see other bids and do
not communicate. Even if a Vickrey is reliably implemented inside of a blockchain, the
communication of the bidders can not be prevented, if they use other communication
channels.
4 Examples
4.1 Renting Agreement
Solvent
Rent
Rent
2 2
Keep
5 -1
Keep
Rent
-1 5
Keep
-1 -1
Bankrupt
Rent
Rent
-10 -30
Keep
-10 -1
Keep
Rent
-1 -30
Keep
-1 -1
Fig. 3. Big land-lords’ (red) and small land-lords’ (blue) game. Green lines depict the probability
of a tenant being solid or bankrupt in future. Narrow lines connect nodes indistinguishable for a
particular decision-maker. Black lines depict the calculated Nash equilibrium.
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Modern economies rely on the workforce, which can relocate according to work-
force demand. It is therefore important, that the employees can find affordable shelters.
But, tenants are prone to bankruptcy and bankrupt tenants are prone to homelessness.
Homelessness often causes irreversible damage to the affected people and therefore
damages the whole society. If a tenant is bankrupt and can not pay the rent, the landlord
is interested in a speedy eviction. A bankrupt tenant is interested in delaying eviction as
much as possible.
In Germany for instance, a delay of two months’ rents legitimates the landlord to
take legal actions to achieve an eviction. In reality, the landlord waits longer than a year
until the eviction can be executed by authorities. The landlord bears the costs and has
to suffer possible vandalism. Renting loss insurances only incur renting contracts with
tenants of clearly verifiable income statements and credit scores. Due to higher finan-
cial reserves, big landlords do not need this insurance at all. In case of tenants with less
clear scores and income statements, a small landlord is more affected than a bigger one,
since he is more prone to financial risks and management mistakes.
Fig.3 shows the game-theoretic representation of this interaction. For small land
lords, the described regulation can render the renting unprofitable for tenants of low
credit score. This reduces the mobility of young employees of lower credit scores in re-
turn since they get less offers. On the other hand, the big landlords can demand higher
rents. Algorithmic legislation and law enforcement might be very useful for automatic
optimisation of the regulation depending on the economic situation. It could also eval-
uate and introduce some additional measures like an obligatory renting loss insurance.
4.2 Trade by Organisations
In 2017, Ukraine’s justice ministry conducted trial auctions using blockchain technol-
ogy to improve transparency in governmental transactions [45]. Transparency is needed
to hinder corruption through collusion in auctions of governmental assets – the unlawful
benefits of public officials. If PASM require deals to be sealed at best conditions pos-
sible for the whole social machine and not for some individuals, trustfully conducted
auctions offer a mechanism to achieve it. Corruption in trade by organisations does not
only cause damage on the state level, but also on the corporate level. Procurement in
supply chains requires constant optimisation by competition of suppliers not only re-
garding costs, but also secondary criteria as ecological footprint, work conditions in
production and so on. These secondary criteria are important for the prosperity of the
whole social machine beyond the goal of the single enterprises sealing deals in a supply
chain.
Developing auction rule sets is not trivial and has a long history. Already 500 BC
in Babylon, maidens were auctioned in forward and reverse auctions [46]. In a forward
auction, the bride price to be paid by the swains is determined, while a reverse auction
is about the dowry to be paid to the swains. Since then, the auctions, fortunately, moved
into less barbaric contexts and the number of used rule sets for them increased dramat-
ically [47]. With the rise of the internet, more complicated auction rule sets could be
implemented, which were unfeasible without computer systems. For instance, a multi-
attribute auction allows bids, which consist of more than one attribute [48]. In a standard
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English auction, a bid is a price, which has to be higher than the previous bid in forward
auction case and lower in a reverse auction case. In a multi-attribute auction, the price
will be only one attribute of many and a utility function determines, whether a bid is
an improvement upon the previous one. Special auction rule sets can be optimised and
deployed in diverse contexts inside of an algocratic social machine. The goal is not to
command free enterprises and free individuals, but to set the right incentives for the
common goals.
4.3 Research Founding
Industrialised countries spend single-digit perceptual shares of GDP on R&D. The op-
timisation of technosphere required for algocracy relies on efficient research. Research
funding has to be spent on the most promising projects and most promising individ-
uals. Currently, popular scientometric measures like h-index set disputable incentives
[49]. For instance, the growth of the author’s number per paper is incentivised, since
increased the number of papers per author and also the number of citations. The data of
scientific publications shows a clear proof that this incentive makes an impact. Further,
it incentivises organisational and political talents instead of actual innovation origi-
nators. An algocratic social machine hands over a lot of organisational and political
tasks to algorithms and therefore will concentrate the funding on innovation origina-
tors. Technologies like text mining and data citation could play a crucial role in this
process.
4.4 Attention Inequality
There is a silent agreement between a search engine provider and its user – search en-
gine provides most relevant results on top to any search request given by the user. This
agreement is not a formal contract and does not involve the actual third party namely
the search result providers. A similar agreement between major media outlets and their
readers. The supposedly most important stories are on the title page. Also for media,
these agreements did not include any third parties till now. Finally, social networks also
apply certain filtering on user-generated contents based on some significance ranking
[50].
Given the fact that attention is a scarce asset on the internet and a precondition
for monetary income and other non-monetary benefits, a justification for this attention
inequality becomes an issue of interest. In the case of media, bizarre effects like miss-
ing white woman syndrome and hierarchy of death can be observed [51,52] – people’s
suffering gets different coverage depending on their origin. This is clearly a dysfunc-
tion. In less critical contexts, attention inequality achieves generally much higher GINI
coefficients than wealth inequality [53]. For an algocratic social machine, this will be
important to assess the justified share of attention inequality. The unjustified share of
attention inequality can be explained by Matthew effect, which can make a low-quality
content to get more attention than a high-quality content [54].
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4.5 Sortition
Sortition is the selection of political officials by random, which is known since ancient
Athenian democracy. According to the law of large numbers, sortition would ensures
the implementation of the average will of the general public for larger pools of selected
officials. For instance, if sortition creates a relatively small random parliament of 22
seats from a population of 1M people including 50k proponents of a dictatorship, the
probability of these radicals getting 11 seats and more is only 0.000000002 – it will take
millions of years until the democracy is overthrown by chance. Sortition appears to be
more secure at fulfilling democracy than an election. As already mentioned, the politi-
cal decisions in the US democracy do not correlate with the will of the general public
[15]. Otherwise, political parties are reported to spend significant amounts of money on
data-driven electoral campaigns [55] – voters’ behaviour is influenced by algorithms.
Ancient Greeks built special machines to ensure a fair random selection. In algocracy
this task will be done by algorithms.
5 Conclusion
We made a summarising journey from cloudy fears to the main technologies and con-
cepts around the coming radical transformation by algocracy. Main theses are:
1. Historical milestones show clear worldwide trends towards establishment of algo-
cracy regardless of political background.
2. Majority of the population is not in favour of this transformation, although algo-
cracy has the potential to address such problems as environmental degradation,
discrimination and unjustified economic inequalities.
3. There are no clear signs that algocracy might shift the power balance either towards
even smaller elite or towards the populace.
4. The legislature and the judiciary can be automated by Weak AI and full automation
of the executive requires AGI.
5. Automation of judiciary requires smart contract implementation.
6. Automation of legislature is a data-driven process of mechanism design based on
simulation.
7. Development of a language for smart contracts is the core element for algocracy
since it builds the interface between the virtual machine, the mechanism design,
the data formatting and the human subjects.
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